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In 2005, hurricanes Katrina and Rita forced many children to relocate across the Southeast. While
schools quickly enrolled evacuees, receiving families worried about the impact of evacuees on non-evacuee
students. Data from Houston and Louisiana show that, on average, the influx of evacuees moderately
reduced elementary math test scores in Houston. We reject linear-in-means models of peer effects
and find evidence of a highly non-linear but monotonic model - student achievement improves with
high ability and worsens with low ability peers. Moreover, exposure to undisciplined evacuees increased




















Bruce.I.Sacerdote@dartmouth.edu1.  Introduction 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Southeast Louisiana. 
Katrina was one of the five deadliest hurricanes in the U.S. causing about 2,500 deaths. It 
was also the most destructive and costliest hurricane ever in the U.S., with a total 
estimated damage of over $80 billion (Knabb, Rhome and Brown, 2006). The storm 
surge caused flooding in 80% of New Orleans as well as large areas of the coasts of 
Mississippi and Alabama. Federal disaster declarations covered 90,000 square miles of 
the U.S. Just a few weeks later, Hurricane Rita hit Louisiana and East Texas. Rita was the 
most powerful storm ever recorded in the Gulf and while it hit a less populated area, there 
was still substantial damage as a result of the storm. 
Katrina and Rita caused over a million people to evacuate from the Central Gulf 
coast to other areas of the U.S.; one of the greatest migrations of children and their 
families in U.S. history (Ladd, Marzalek and Gill, 2008). Some areas of Louisiana 
received large numbers of evacuees. Baton Rouge received over 15,000 evacuees and 
Hammond received over 10,000 evacuees, nearly doubling their populations. However, 
many evacuees left the affected states. Houston, Texas received 75,000 people, which 
was the largest number of evacuees received by any city (McIntosh, 2008). 
As a result of the migration, many children were uprooted. Given that schools 
were probably the best way to bring back stability into children’s lives, school districts 
mounted substantial efforts to enroll the evacuees in their schools as quickly as possible. 
Districts in Louisiana not affected by the hurricanes took in about 196,000 children (Pane 
et. al, 2007). Houston area schools took nearly 20,000 evacuee children since hurricanes 
  3Katrina and Rita struck, with the Houston Independent School District enrolling over 
5,000 students. 
While Baton Rouge, Houston and other cities were seen as great examples of 
solidarity, the influx of large numbers of kids into the schools created concerns among 
the non-evacuee population. Evacuee children came from some of the worst-performing 
schools in the country and parents worried that their children would be negatively 
affected by the disruption caused by the influx of poor performing students. Disruption 
due to student turnover is a concern even under ordinary circumstances. For instance, 
Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004) report that about a third of all students in Texas move 
at least once in elementary and middle school and that these moves adversely affect the 
academic performance of the movers’ new classmates.
1 Moreover, the negative spillovers 
from disruptive behavior have been considered by Figlio (2005) and Carrell and Hoekstra 
(Forthcoming), who show (respectively) that the presence of boys with female sounding 
names or children exposed to domestic violence decreases the academic achievement of 
their peers. 
In this paper, we use administrative data from the Houston Independent School 
District and the Louisiana Department of Education to examine whether the influx of 
Katrina and Rita students adversely affected the academic performance, attendance and 
discipline of their new peers.
2 Much of the literature on peer effects for higher education 
finds modest positive peer effects on GPA (e.g., Carrell, Fullerton and West, 2008; Lyle, 
                                                 
1 Hanushek et al. (2004) also report that these moves are particularly prevalent among low income and 
minority students and that the adverse effects of turnover for black and Hispanic receiving students are 
about seven and five times larger, respectively, than the effect for whites. 
2 Other work has considered the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on evacuees themselves. Sacerdote 
(2008) shows that evacuee students had improved test scores in the medium-term from attending new 
schools. Vigdor (2008, 2007), Groen and Polivka (2008), and Belasaen and Polachek (2008) look at the 
economic impacts of the Hurricanes on New Orleans and evacuee labor supply. Paxson and Rouse (2008) 
look at what caused evacuees to return to New Orleans. 
  42007; Sacerdote, 2001; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006; and Zimmerman, 2003), 
but results for elementary and secondary education are more mixed with some studies 
finding little or no effects (e.g., Angrist and Lang, 2004; Burke and Sass, 2008; Hanushek 
et al., 2003; Vigdor and Nechyba, forthcoming) and others finding large effects (e.g., 
Hoxby, 2000; and Hoxby and Weingarth, 2006; Lavy and Schlosser, 2007; Lavy, 
Paserman and Schlosser, 2008). In contrast, evidence on peer effects on social outcomes 
shows consistently large effects (e.g. Aizer, 2008; Carrell, Malmstrom and West, 2008; 
Case and Katz, 1991; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Lavy and Schlosser, 2007). 
An advantage of our study is that we can exploit the exogenous influx of new 
students into the Houston and Louisiana schools to examine peer effects. In fact, many 
evacuees were evacuated on buses without knowing where they were going. Others were 
able to drive but had very limited options in terms of where to go, often residing in 
shelters, motels, or with friends and family. Thus, since the parents of Katrina children 
were hardly able to self-select into schools, our identification strategy helps overcome the 
usual selection problem present in peer effects specifications. Moreover, we are able to 
overcome the reflection problem, since evacuees’ prior achievement is exogenous to 
native students.
3 Our natural experiment is closest to the studies by Boozer and Cacciola 
(2001), Hoxby (2000), Hoxby and Weingarth (2006), Lavy and Schlosser (2007) and 
especially to Angrist and Lang (2004), but has two advantages. First, the incoming 
students in our quasi-experiment are more alike in racial composition and economic 
status to the receiving students than the bused and receiving students in the Boston Metco 
study. Second, we have good measures of behavior (including discipline and attendance 
                                                 
3 On the other hand, like most of the literature, we will be capturing both endogenous and exogenous peer 
effects, as defined by Manski (1993). 
  5data), which allow us to examine the impacts of peers on behavior using administrative 
data rather than self-reported data, so that our results are less likely to be subject to 
measurement error bias. 
On average, we find that the influx of evacuees had little impact on native student 
achievement or discipline - only math for Houston elementary students shows a 
statistically significant drop of 0.09 standard deviations for a 10 percentage point increase 
in Katrina/Rita share in the school. We also find drops in attendance rates of Houston 
middle and high school black natives of 1.3 percentage points for a 10 percentage point 
increase in Katrina/Rita share. These results are robust to validity tests using instrumental 
variables and placebo experiments. 
In addition to establishing whether there are peer effects by exploiting exogenous 
changes in peer composition, an important contribution of this paper is our focus on the 
structure of peer effects. With the exceptions of Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) who 
consider various models of peer effects and Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser (2008) who 
investigate how having low-achieving peers affects teacher behavior, most of the 
previous literature focuses solely on the difficult task of establishing whether peer effects 
exist. Here, we, also examine the mechanisms through which peer effects work. In 
particular, we contrast monotonicity, linear-in-means, boutique, invidious comparison, 
and bad apple models of peer effects (see, e.g., Hoxby and Weingarth (2006), and 
Sacerdote (forthcoming)). 
We find strong evidence in favor of the monotonicity model and against the 
invidious comparison model, in the sense that all students benefit from having higher 
quality peers and are hurt by having low quality peers. In addition, we establish that these 
  6monotonic effects are non-linear, thus rejecting linear-in-means models that are common 
in the literature. We also find some evidence, albeit weak, of the benefits of tracking 
students, or the so-called boutique model, since in some cases students appear to benefit 
from being with peers of the same academic level. These results are consistent with 
Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) who also find support of the boutique and monotonicity 
models and reject linear-in-means. 
Moreover, we find support for the bad apple model in terms of behavior as 
described by Lazear (2001) - the presence of even a few disruptive students in the 
classroom can have large negative effects on discipline and attendance of native kids. On 
the other hand, we do not find evidence that children with disciplinary problems worsen 
academic performance of natives. Rather, peer effects on test scores seem to be working 
through the academic performance of peers, given the differential impacts of poor and 
highly performing peers. 
  Finally, we address some other potential avenues through which evacuees may 
affect native students. In particular, we consider the impact of Katrina/Rita share on class 
sizes, per-student expenditures, average teacher experience, and native student switching. 
These results, for the most part, show no statistically significant impacts with the notable 
exception that in Houston elementary schools average teacher education and certification 
rates seemed to increase. This evidence combined with the fact that we see very different 
impacts across achievement levels of natives and evacuees strongly suggest that our 
estimates are picking up peer effects rather than other changes. 
  72.  Katrina’s Children and School Responses 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused one of the largest displacements of children in 
the history of the U.S. About 400,000 students were forced to enroll in new schools as a 
result of these hurricanes (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). School districts across 
the country acted quickly to open their doors to evacuated students as required under the 
McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Improvement Act (Edwards, 2007).  
Within Louisiana, people mostly evacuated to places where they had family and 
friends. However, evacuees to East Baton Rouge were mainly living on FEMA assistance 
and went to cheap hotels and apartments. While in 2005-06 many schools in Louisiana 
received no evacuees at all, the average and greatest evacuee enrollment in our analysis 
sample which excludes schools outside the affected areas and those with more than 70% 
evacuees were 3.1% and 56%, respectively. Figure 1 displays a map of the percentage of 
Katrina student evacuees in Louisiana schools, which shows substantial variation in terms 
of exposure to the evacuee children. 
Many students, however, went outside of the state - Texas alone received 50,000 
students. In Houston, many students and their families were housed in shelters, which 
included 30,400 residents housed in the Reliant Park complex (Reliant Center, News 
Release), the largest evacuation shelter in U.S. history. Many more evacuees were housed 
in the George R. Brown Convention Center and Red Cross shelters throughout the city. 
By August 31, 2005, just two days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, HISD was 
already admitting evacuees into the district’s schools while providing school bus stops at 
shelters to transport the children. Initially, displaced students in the stadium complex and 
convention center were placed in schools close to the shelters and with available spots. 
  8Students residing in other locations were mostly sent to the school zoned to their address. 
Figure 2 shows the map of Houston ISD. This map shows that some schools in Houston 
received no evacuees at all, while in others evacuees comprised of up to 25% of the 
student population in October 31, 2005, showing substantial variation in the influx of 
Katrina students across the district. The mean percentage of evacuees in HISD at the time 
was 2.5%. 
While the receiving school districts made a great effort to accommodate the 
thousands of new students, some worried about the financial burden on the taxpayers of 
the receiving areas. For example, one news report provided said that HISD would face an 
extra $20 million in costs over the 2005-2006 school year (Klein, 2006). However, given 
that districts were enrolling homeless students, they were eligible for federal education 
grants. Also, after three months Congress passed the Hurricane Education Recovery Act 
(HERA) to provide impact aid for districts enrolling displaced students and to provide aid 
to restore educational facilities which had been damaged by the hurricanes. The amount 
per student from HERA was set to cover $6,000 per displaced student (Radcliffe, 2006). 
With regards to reduced resources, a main concern was that schools receiving many 
evacuees would experience a sharp rise in the student/teacher ratio. However, below we 
present evidence showing that evacuees generated no statistically significant increase in 
class sizes or expenditures per student. 
In addition to funding issues, teachers and parents of non-evacuee students were 
concerned that some evacuees were years behind in terms of academic achievement. In 
our interviews with teachers and principals in Houston, many indicated that Katrina 
students were on average one or several years below grade level. Aside from issues 
  9related to academic performance, in middle and high-school, there were reports that feuds 
between students became more common after the arrival of the evacuees. In response to 
this, in the 2006-2007 school year, police presence was increased by 10% in 18 
secondary schools. 
In what follows, we discuss the strategy we use to estimate peer effects of Katrina 
and Rita evacuees on the academic performance and discipline of non-evacuee students, 
and to uncover the structure and channels through which peer effects work. 
3.  Identification Strategy 
We estimate the direct impact of the influx of Katrina and Rita evacuees into 
Louisiana’s and Houston’s schools on native students as follows, 
Yigjt = α + βKatrina_Fractionjt + ΩXigjt + ПGradeg + ГYeart + ФGradeg×Yeart + κj + εigjt, 
(1) 
where Yigjt is the academic or disciplinary outcome of individual i in grade g attending 
school j at time t, Katrina_Fractionjt is the number of Katrina and Rita evacuees divided 
by the total number of students in school j in March of year t+1 for Louisiana and in 
October of year t for Houston, where this fraction is zero before the 2005-2006 academic 
year. Xigjt are observable characteristics of individual i in grade g attending school j at 
time t, including indicators for whether the student is female, white, Black, Hispanic, 
Asian, Native American, and whether the student gets free-lunch, reduced-priced lunch or 
is classified as being otherwise economically disadvantaged.
4 Gradeg and Yeart are grade 
and year effects and κj are school-fixed effects. The addition of school and year effects 
makes this a difference-in-differences specification in which changes in outcomes before 
                                                 
4 The other economic disadvantage and Native American categories are only available for HISD. 
  10and after the storm for schools that received a lot of evacuees are compared to changes 
for schools that received few evacuees. 
The impact of the influx of Katrina evacuees could capture externalities of the 
evacuees on native kids, but it could also capture reduced per-student resources or exiting 
of the best students from these schools. To check whether the effects of the evacuees on 
academic and disciplinary outcomes are due to reduced resources or attrition of the best 
students, we run a similar specification to regression (1) for the probability of moving to 
other schools one year later as well as for class size, expenditures per student, and teacher 
experience at the school level. 
Throughout the paper we use the share of evacuees in the entire school rather than 
within grade as our measure of exposure. We do this for a two reasons. First, due to the 
limited number of grades tested in LA prior to 2005-06, using grade level evacuee share 
restricts our sample size considerably in non-linear models.
5 Second, it is likely that 
native students were exposed to many evacuees outside their grade especially in middle 
and high school where many classes have students from multiple grades. Nonetheless, 
results using grade-level Katrina/Rita share (available upon request) show the same 
patterns as school-level results. 
  In addition to estimating reduced-form models as in equation (1), we follow a 
similar approach to Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) to examine non-linear peer effects, but 
using quartiles rather than deciles since our data has less variation. For native students in 
both Houston and Louisiana, along with evacuees in Louisiana, we classify students by 
their pre-Katrina test-score quartiles. We do not have pre-Katrina test scores for Houston 
                                                 
5 When generating the school-level Katrina/Rita share we extrapolate the share in the grades where students 
have pre-Katrina tests to the entire school so as not to lose observations. 
  11evacuees, thus we use their 2005-2006 scores. We estimate specifications in which we 
regress fully saturated models of the test score of native students in each quartile, 
Q2004=1,2,3,4, where the quartile is based on their test scores in 2004-2005, on the 
percentages of evacuees in their school who fall in each quartile on the basis of their test 
scores in 2004-2005 as follows,
6 
E(Yigjt|Q2004)= α + β1Katrina_FractionQ1_2004jt + β2Katrina_FractionQ2_2004jt  
+ β3Katrina_FractionQ3_2004jt + β4Katrina_FractionQ4_2004jt  
+ ΩXigjt + ПGradeg + ГYeart + ФGradeg×Yeart + κj + εigjt. 
 (2) 
This specification lets us compare differential effects of the influx of Katrina 
evacuees in each quartile on natives from each quartile. More importantly, this non-linear 
specification also allows us to test different models of peer effects. The monotonicity 
model posits that the higher the quality of the peers the greater the positive effect and the 
lower the quality of peers the bigger the negative effect on natives. Thus, our test of 
monotonicity requires that each quartile estimate is greater than all of the estimates for 
lower quartiles - β4 > β3, β4 > β2, β4 > β1, β3 > β2, β3 > β1, and β2 > β1,• An alternative, albeit 
weaker, test would also be to simply see if β4 > β1; i.e. that the extremes of the evacuee 
distribution produce monotonic effects. By contrast, the invidious comparison model says 
that having higher quality peers reduces the academic performance of other students who 
may loose confidence or enter in invidious comparisons. Likewise, having low 
performing peers may actually raise the academic performance of other students. Thus, a 
                                                 
6 Since our pre-Katrina data in Louisiana is limited to grades 4, 8, and 10 in 2003-04 and 2004-05, we use 
pre-Katrina test-scores for whichever of those two years the student is observed to identify the student’s 
quartile for all years. 
  12test of the invidious comparison model is the opposite from the monotonicity model, i.e., 
β4 < β1, and so on.  
Another popular model of peer effects is the boutique model which says that a 
student will do better when he is surrounded by peers with a similar level. The idea is that 
if the student is surrounded by similar students then teachers can best cater to their type. 
The boutique model, thus, emphasizes the potential benefits of tracking students by 
academic level.
7 A test of the boutique model thus requires that the impact of those in 
one’s own quartile be greater than the impact of peers in any other quartile. Hence, we 
test whether βi > βj for all i ≠ j where i is the native student’s quartile. We also test the 
linear-in-means model by checking whether the impact for those in the lowest quartile is 
the opposite impact from that for those in the highest quartile of the native distribution, 
i.e., where βij is the estimate for native quartile i and evacuee quartile j, we test β44 = -β14 , 
β43 = -β13, β42 = -β12 and β41 = -β14. 
Since we have less variability in terms of the quality of the evacuees in Houston, 
we estimate a similar regression but splitting the evacuee shares only by whether they fall 
above or below the median in terms of test scores or attendance. Also, because we do not 
observe test scores or attendance for evacuees before Katrina, we use 2005-2006 data to 
determine this split. Thus, for Houston we estimate fully saturated models of test scores 
or attendance for native students in each quartile, Q2004=1,2,3,4, where the quartile is 
based on their test scores in 2004-2005, on the percentages of evacuees in their school 
who fall below or above the median on the basis of their test scores in 2005-2006 as 
follows, 
                                                 
7 The explicit benefits of tracking are still highly controversial and research in the US has generally not 
been able to establish causal estimates.  Nonetheless, Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2008) conduct a tracking 
experiment in Kenya and find that it increases test scores at all levels of the ability distribution.  
  13E(Yigjt|Q2004)= α + β1Katrina_FractionBelowMedian_2005jt + β2Katrina_FractionAboveMedian_2005jt  
+ ΩXigjt + ПGradeg + ГYeart + ФGradeg×Yeart + κj + εigjt. 
 (3) 
Like the quartile regressions for LA, we also use these results to test the models described 
above. 
  We also test a version of the “bad apple” model which suggests that a small 
number of disruptive kids can generate large negative effects on other students. In 
particular, we check whether the increase in the share of evacuees with disciplinary 
problems have negative effects on academic performance and behavior of natives over 
and above the effect of the increase in the share of all evacuees. That is, we estimate the 
following regression: 
Yigjt = α + βKatrina_Fractionjt + γKatrina_Fraction*Avg_Evac_Infractionjt +jt + ΩXigjt + 
ПGradeg + ГYeart + ФGradeg×Yeart + κj + εigjt, 
(4) 
where Katrina_Fraction*Avg_Evac_Infractionjt is the interaction of evacuee share with 
the average evacuee infraction rate in 2004-05 for Louisiana and in the current year for 
Houston. In Houston, where we have information about evacuee allocation to different 
classrooms, we also test whether the presence of only a few disciplined evacuees in the 
classroom has a substantial effect on native students. 
Given the initial chaos and uncertainty facing the evacuees, the initial assignment 
to schools was plausibly exogenous, so we interpret the coefficient on “Katrina_Fraction” 
as capturing the causal effect of the influx of Katrina and Rita evacuees on non-evacuee 
students. However, after a few months some evacuees moved to apartment complexes 
  14and more permanent residences and may have also moved schools. While this may 
generate endogenous selection into schools, many students remained in temporary 
residences and those that found permanent residences often moved to places that would 
allow their children to attend their initially assigned schools. Given that we are exploiting 
within school variation over time, to address this concern we use the initial fraction of 
Katrina/Rita evacuees in a school on September 13, 2005 as an instrument for the fraction 
of Katrina evacuees in the last week of October of each year in Houston which may be 
contaminated by self-selection of students to schools over time.
8 Using this instrumental 
variable strategy, the first-stage is 
Katrina_Fractionjt = δ0 + δ1Initial_Katrina_Fractionj2005 + СXigjt + РGradeg +  
ТYeart + УGradeg × Yeart + λj + νigjt, 
(5) 
And where the second stage is as in equation (1), but the fraction of Katrina evacuees is 
substituted for the predicted fraction of Katrina evacuees based on initial assignment to 
schools. The exclusion restriction imposes that, conditional on school fixed-effects and 
student characteristics, academic performance and disciplinary measures are independent 
of the initial fraction of displaced students. 
Also, since one may worry that Katrina evacuees may be moving to school with 
pre-existing negative trends in the academic performance of the native kids, we perform a 
placebo experiment in which we regress pre-Katrina test scores and attendance on the 
future share of Katrina evacuees in a school. 
 
                                                 
8 “Initial_Katrina_Fraction” excludes students who were residing at the stadium complex or convention 
center, as almost all of these students switched to new schools within two weeks. Unfortunately, we do not 
have similar instruments for Louisiana, so the IV analysis is limited to HISD data. 
  154.  Data Description 
4.1.  Louisiana Department of Education Data 
Louisiana testing data comes from the Department of Education Division of 
Standards, Assessment and Accountability via Data Recognition Corporation and covers 
all students in the state who took the state criterion-referenced exams from the 2003-2004 
year to the 2006-2007 academic year. The data are at the student-level and include 
information on gender, race/ethnicity, free\reduced price lunch status and, most 
importantly, achievement. Test scores are available for grades 3 - 10 after Katrina, but 
only for grades 4, 8 and 10 before Katrina. In addition, we obtained data from the 
Louisiana Department of Education on the number of both in-school and out-of-school 
suspensions and expulsions - which we combine into a single measure of disciplinary 
infractions - for all students who take the LEAP/iLEAP exam.  
The Louisiana data allows us to describe where evacuees came from and where 
they went. The parishes most affected by Hurricane Katrina were Orleans, Jefferson, 
Plaquemines, and Saint Bernard. These parishes comprise most of the Greater New 
Orleans Metropolitan Statistical Area. Ninety percent of the students in the affected 
parishes become evacuees and, of the Katrina evacuees, 93% come from the most 
affected parishes. Even after the hurricanes, the bulk of Katrina evacuees who remain in 
Louisiana attended a school in one of the four most affected parishes. The percentage of 
evacuees who attend schools in the affected parishes is 93% in the 2003-2004 and 2004-
2005 school years, before the hurricanes. However, the following academic year, this 
dips to 68% in the spring, but rises back to 76% by the 2006-2007 school year. 
  16In our analysis, we exclude schools in the areas directly affected by hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. Thus, we exclude schools in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, Saint 
Bernard, and Plaquemines, which were directly affected by hurricane Katrina, as well as 
the parishes of Cameron and Calcasieu which were affected by hurricane Rita. We also 
exclude all schools with more than 70% evacuees, since these were likely schools in the 
affected areas or so close to the affected parishes that they essentially became schools 
exclusively for evacuee children. We further exclude observations in 2006-07 for 
students who are not observed in 2005-06 as their evacuee status is unknown for these 
students. This leaves us with 341,179 observations, including 14,628 evacuee 
observations. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for evacuees and non-evacuees in the both the 
Louisiana and Houston samples. It is noteworthy that evacuees in LA are more likely to 
be black and economically disadvantaged. Non-evacuees are 44% African-American 
while evacuees are 59% African-American. Also, evacuees are more likely to be 
economically disadvantaged. Of the evacuees 81% are eligible for free lunch, while 57% 
of non-evacuees qualify. 
Our main outcome measures are test results for math and English language arts 
(ELA) which combines reading and language.
9 Under Louisiana's accountability 
program, students in grades 4, 8, and 10 were tested in March of each year prior to 2005. 
These tests are known as the LEAP or Louisiana Educational Assessment Program 
(grades 4 and 8) and the GEE or Graduation Exit Examination (grade 10). The LEAP and 
                                                 
9 Science and social studies are tested as well; however as is common in the literature we only consider 
math and reading. 
  17GEE tests are high stakes tests which must be passed to be promoted to the next grade.
10 
High stakes testing policies were suspended for all 4th and 8th grade students during the 
2005-2006 school year due to the hurricanes. 
In 2005-06, in response to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2003, Louisiana 
expanded the testing regime to include grades 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9 for math and ELA.
11 
Unlike LEAP these exams are based on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills and with questions 
added to align the test to criterions required by state and Federal law. In addition, while 
the iLEAP contributes to determining whether the school meets “adequate yearly 
progress” under the NCLB act, it is a “low-stakes” exam for students in that their scores 
do not affect grade advancement. We include LEAP, iLEAP, and GEE in our analysis. 
                                                
Test scores are measured as standard deviation within a grade and year, including 
all test-takers. Table 1 shows that LA evacuees are about one-quarter of a standard 
deviation below non-evacuee students. Table 2 reports differences in test scores after 
controlling for individual characteristics and school effects. Pre-Katrina math and ELA 
test scores of evacuees in primary schooling are 0.12 and 0.14 of a standard deviation 
lower than those of non-evacuees with similar post-storm scores. In middle-school and 
high-school, pre-storm test scores of evacuees are 0.07 and 0.11 standard deviations 
lower than those of non-evacuees again with post-storm scores showing similar 
differences. Figure 3 shows the position of evacuees relative to natives in the same 
schools in 2004-2005. This figure shows that evacuees are much more likely to be in the 
 
10 To be promoted to the next grade, students in grades 4 and 8 must score “Basic” on at least one of the 
math and ELA tests and at least “Approaching Basic” on a specified subject exam. In order to be eligible 
for a standard high school diploma, high school students must receive “Approaching Basic” or better on 
both the ELA and math exams and “Approaching Basic” or better on either of the science or social studies 
exams. 
11 Grades 3, 5, 6, and 7 were also added for science and social studies 
  18first decile compared to their native counter-parts, while they are as likely or less likely to 
be in deciles 2 through 10. This is important especially when we consider the non-linear 
models below. 
Table 1 also shows that LA evacuees are more likely have disciplinary problems, 
although Table 2 shows a more nuanced picture after controlling for individual 
characteristics and school effects. In particular, evacuees have more disciplinary 
infractions before the hurricanes, lower or the same in the year the hurricanes hit, and 
higher again in 2006-2007. A likely explanation for this is that in the year of the 
hurricanes, schools were more lax in terms of discipline with the evacuee children. 
4.2.  Houston Independent School District Data 
  HISD provided us with student-level administrative records from 2003-2004 to 
2006-2007. The data includes basic demographic characteristics, including race, gender, 
economic disadvantage status, and immigration status, and whether they qualify as gifted 
and talented, as having limited English proficiency, or require special education. In 
addition, we have information on math and reading scores from the Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) Exam, which is the exam used in Texas for accountability 
purposes.
12 Students in grades 3 - 11 take TAKS and, as in Louisiana, TAKS is “high 
stakes” in certain grades and subjects and “low stakes” in others.
13 In addition, while 
evacuees had to take the TAKS exams in 2005-06, their performance did not count 
towards the school’s accountability rating, although by 2006-07 evacuees scores were 
                                                 
12 Less than 1% of students have multiple math and 4% have multiple reading scores in a given year due to 
retakes. Since we cannot identify which score refers to a student’s first exam we instead use the student’s 
lowest score in each subject for that academic year. 
13 State law requires that students must pass the reading test in 3
rd grade as well as both reading and math in 
5
th and 8
th grades to be promoted. HISD also requires students in grades 4, 6, and 7 to pass math and 
reading TAKS for promotion. Students also need to pass the 11
th grade exit-level exams in math, English 
and language arts, science, and social-studies in order to graduate. 
  19included in accountability calculations.
14 Moreover, we also have information for each 
student in grades 1 - 12 on the number of disciplinary infractions resulting in an in-school 
suspension or more severe punishment and the attendance rate. As in LA, we drop 
students in 2006-07 who are not observed in 2005-06 leaving us with 171,659 native and 
4,986 evacuee observations in grades 1 - 12. 
Returning to Table 1 we see that, as in Louisiana, evacuees in Houston are more 
likely to be African-American and economically disadvantaged. The majority of non-
evacuee students are Hispanic and African-American, with these two groups accounting 
for 88% of the student population and White and Asian students accounting for the 
remainder. By contrast, about 90% of the evacuees are African-American, and only 10% 
White, Hispanic and Asian combined. This is important to keep in mind if one believes 
that displaced students are more likely to interact and generate peer effects for non-
evacuees of their same race/ethnicity. About 69% of the HISD native students are 
identified as receiving free lunch and as being at-risk. This fraction contrasts with about 
97% of the evacuees who qualify for free lunch and 94% who are identified as being at-
risk.
15 
The scores for TAKS, which we convert from scale scores to standard deviations 
within grade and year using information on all non-evacuee test-takers during that year, 
show evacuees with substantially lower scores than natives in both reading and math. 
Evacuees also have far lower attendance rates - the average attendance rate of natives is 
around 95%, while it is only 83% for evacuees. Disciplinary infractions are also 
                                                 
14 One principal we spoke with noted that, while the evacuee scores did not count, the schools still put 
substantial effort into bringing the evacuees up to proficiency in anticipation of their scores counting the 
following year. 
15 At-risk status is defined as being over-aged for your grade, having a difficult situation at home (e.g., 
pregnant, foster child) or having low academic performance (below the 40
th percentile). 
  20considerably higher amongst Houston evacuees. Table 2 shows that the test scores of 
Houston evacuees are one-fifth to two-fifths of a standard deviation lower in elementary 
and about half a standard deviation lower in middle and high school compared to native 
students in the same schools and with the same characteristics.
16 Moreover, the influx of 
evacuees did not simply reduce average test scores but also increased heterogeneity 
within schools. Figure 4 shows the evacuees position relative to natives in the same 
school in 2005-2006. This figure shows that evacuees are greatly over-represented in the 
three lowest deciles of the test-score and and attendance distributions and under-
represented in the upper deciles. 
In addition, Table 2 shows that, controlling for school effects and observables, the 
attendance rate for Houston evacuees is 6 percentage points and 13 percentage points 
lower among primary and secondary evacuee students, respectively. In terms of 
disciplinary infractions, Houston evacuees follow a similar pattern to those in Louisiana - 
they tend to have fewer infractions initially then more the subsequent year. This coincides 
with interviews of school administrators and teachers indicating that school officials were 
initially more lenient with students who were viewed as going through a process of 
adaptation. 
5.  Effects of Evacuees on Native Students’ Academic Performance 
We begin by examining the effect of the influx of Katrina and Rita students on the 
academic performance of their peers. This is a reduced form regression, since there are a 
number of possible reasons why the academic performance of non-evacuees students may 
be affected by the arrival of evacuees at a school. The first is a peer effect story, where 
                                                 
16 It is interesting to point out that the differences between evacuee and non-evacuee test scores were a lot 
bigger in Houston than in Louisiana. 
  21one’s classmates influence the learning process of each student. We consider peer effects 
to encompass an achievement effect that works through peer test scores; a behavior effect 
that works through peers’ disruptive behavior in the classroom as in Figlio (2005) and 
Carrell and Hoekstra (Forthcoming), and a disruption effect from students entering and 
exiting the classroom as in Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004). 
The second reason why the influx of evacuees may reduce native performance is 
if the entry of new students takes resources away from native students. Third, it could be 
that schools hired new teachers to help absorb the evacuees and that these teachers were 
of lower quality than the existing teachers. Finally, native students may respond to the 
influx of evacuees by moving to another school or leaving the school district and this 
would change average test scores by simply changing the composition of the remaining 
students. While in this section we present reduced form results that could capture any of 
these four channels, in section 7 we present results from regressions of class size, 
expenditures per student, teacher experience and the probability of moving schools or 
leaving the district on the share of Katrina evacuees which provide evidence that our 
reduced-form estimates are likely capturing the first channel. 
This section also presents results of non-linear models, which allow us to test 
different models of peer effects. In addition, since non-linearities are more consistent 
with peer effects than with the other three stories which should generate similar effects 
throughout the distribution of natives, these models further help us to separate peer 
effects from the alternative explanations. 
 
 
  225.1. Reduced-Form  Models 
  We use both HISD and Louisiana data to estimate equation (1). Table 3 presents 
the estimates of the evacuee share on math and language scores of non-evacuee students. 
Panels A and B present results for Louisiana and Panels C and D present results for 
HISD, for elementary schools and middle and high schools, respectively. Column (1) 
reports the results for the overall sample, while Columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) report 
results of fully saturated models for African-Americans, Hispanics, boys and girls. These 
results show mainly negative but insignificant effects in Louisiana. 
  The results for Houston, reported in Panels B and C, instead show significantly 
negative effects on math test scores for elementary students. Column (1) of panel C 
shows that for all elementary students an increase of 10 percentage points in the influx of 
Katrina students reduces math test scores for all non-evacuee children by 0.09 of a 
standard deviation. Measuring this effect in the schools that received the highest share of 
evacuees (i.e., 25%) suggests that the influx of evacuees reduce average test scores of a 
native student’s peers by 0.19 of a standard deviation and this, in turn, generates a decline 
in native test scores of 0.23 of a standard deviation. The results show even bigger effects 
for blacks and girls. An increase of 10 percentage points in the influx of Katrina students 
reduces math scores by 0.12 and 0.11 for blacks and girls, respectively, with only the 
latter being significant. Similarly, reading test scores of non-evacuee elementary school 
children decrease with the influx of Katrina children but the decrease is not significant. 
By contrast, the results in Panel D show that test scores of middle- and high-school 
students show no statistically significant effects from the entry of evacuees into their 
schools. 
  235.2. Robustness  Checks 
5.2.1.  Placebo Experiment: Pre-Katrina Impacts 
In Column (6) of Table 3 we present the results from a falsification test in the 
spirit of Angrist and Krueger (1999) by regressing the pre-Katrina outcomes on the post-
Katrina shares of evacuees in the schools as if these shares corresponded to 2004-2005. 
The idea is that if we are simply capturing pre-existing trends in the schools, then the 
coefficients in the share of evacuees should show up as being significant. Thus we set 
Katrina share to zero in 2003-04 and to the 2005-06 value for observations2004-05, then 
estimate using only data from 2003-04 and 2004-05. The results from this falsification 
test show that the coefficients on the evacuee shares are not significant for elementary nor 
for middle-school and high-school in either Louisiana or Houston, suggesting that we are 
not simply capturing pre-existing differences in trends before the actual influx of the 
evacuees. 
5.2.1. IV  Results:  Houston 
  Since there is some movement across schools as evacuees settle into more 
permanent residences, we address the potential self-selection of evacuees by exploiting 
the initial exogenous allocation and the fact that many people stayed in their initially 
assigned schools. We believe that, even if there is resorting, this initial allocation is 
exogenous conditional on school fixed-effects because of the uncertainty and chaos under 
which evacuees found housing. Indeed, a large proportion of evacuees were living in 
shelters and many continued to live in shelters months after the storm. 
  Column (7) of Table 3 reports second-stage results for Houston where the 
instrument used is the Katrina/Rita share on September 13, 2005 - only two weeks after 
  24Katrina - excluding students from the stadium complex and convention center.
17 As with 
the difference-in-difference results presented above, the second-stage results in Column 
(7) of Table 3 only show a negative effect of the influx of Katrina children on the math 
test scores of elementary school children in Houston. The IV estimate is slightly bigger in 
magnitude and significant at the 10% level. Nonetheless, none of the estimates are 
statistically significantly different from each other, thus providing further evidence of the 
validity of the difference-in-differences specifications. 
5.3. Non-Linear  Models 
Panels A and B of Table 4 report results of non-linear models as in equation (2) 
for elementary and middle and high schools in Louisiana, respectively. The results show 
that the arrival of low academic performance Katrina evacuees hurt natives in all 
quartiles of the pre-Katrina test score distribution in terms of their math and language 
scores. Curiously, the results also show that the ones hurt the most by the presence of low 
achieving evacuees were those at the higher end of the distribution, while natives at the 
lower end of the ability distribution were hurt the least by the arrival of low achieving 
peers. Our findings suggest that an increase of say 6.1 percentage points in bottom 
quartile evacuees - the 95
th percentile of schools in 2005-06 -  decreases native ELA test 
scores by 0.17 and 0.24 of a standard deviation for native elementary and middle/high 
school students at the top quartile of the achievement distribution, but has no statistically 
significant effect on those at the lowest quartile of the achievement distribution. The 
results for elementary math results are not as clear cut, but the effect of a similar increase 
                                                 
17 Almost all evacuees in the stadium and convention center were relocated to other shelters and temporary 
housing by October 2005, thus we exclude them to increase the power of the instrument. The first-stage 
results (not shown here) show that the Katrina/Rita share on September 13, 2005 is significant at the 1% 
level. An increase in Katrina/Rita children of 10% on September 13, 2005 increases the share Katrina/Rita 
on October 28, 2005 by 9.8% in elementary and by 9.6% in middle- and high-school.  
  25in low achieving evacuees would cause an insignificant decline of 0.05 a standard 
deviation for math test scores of top-quartile native students in elementary school and a 
significant decline of 0.12 of a standard deviation for middle/high-school. A possible 
explanation for these results is that the arrival of low achieving evacuees forced teachers 
to focus their teaching time to help low achieving students and this hurt high ability more 
than low ability students. 
By contrast, the arrival of evacuees in the top quartile of the academic distribution 
benefits natives regardless of their previous performance, but the effects are bigger as 
natives move up in the ability distribution. Thus, these results suggest complementarities 
between high-achieving peers. For example, having a top quartile evacuee share in the 
95
th percentile (2.5%) generates an increase in ELA test scores of 0.06 of a standard 
deviation for both elementary and middle and high school natives in the top quartile of 
the achievement distribution, but no significant effect on those in the bottom quartile. A 
similar increase in the share of high achieving evacuees generates an increase in math test 
scores of 0.11 and 0.06 for high achieving natives in elementary and middle and high-
school, but by only 0.05 for low-achieving natives in middle and high-school with no 
significant impact on low-achieving natives in elementary school. A likely explanation 
for this is that the increase in high achieving evacuees in the class forced teachers to raise 
the level of the class more towards high-ability students. This may be consistent with a 
“boutique” model of peer effects as described by Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) where 
students benefit from having similar peers in their classroom regardless of their own 
abilities. At the same time, the fact that low ability natives benefited more from having 
  26high-ability than low-ability evacuees suggests that a monotonicity model where peer 
impacts are increasing in peer ability is also occurring at the same time. 
We test these and other models formally. As explained above, we conduct a 
“strong monotonicity” test by testing whether all estimates of higher quartiles are greater 
than the estimates of the lower quartiles, i.e., βi > βj. The invidious comparison model is 
the mirror image of this model, i.e., βi < βj. Figure 5 shows a histogram of the frequency 
of t-statistics from pair wise tests of equivalence of higher and lower quartiles using the 
regressions in Table 4. We consider t-statistics that exceed 1.645, so that the higher 
quartile is significantly greater than the lower quartile at the 10% level, as providing 
support for monotonicity. Likewise, for tests where the t-statistics are between 1.645 and 
-1.645 we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality. Finally, tests where the t-statistics 
are lower than -1.64 provide support for the hypothesis of invidious comparisons at the 
10% level. Figure 5 shows that the distribution is skewed towards t-stats above 1.645. In 
particular in 42% of the cases we find t-stats above 1.645, which far exceeds the 10% that 
we would expect to find at random. In addition, the fact that 83% of the tests have 
positive t-statistics provides further evidence of monotonicity. We also reject the 
alternative hypothesis of invidious comparisons since only 2% of the cases have t-stats 
below -1.64. An alternative test, which we refer to as “weak monotonicity” is whether 
exposure to evacuees in the top quartile generates a significantly greater impact on 
natives of all quartiles than exposure to evacuees in the bottom quartile. In this case, we 
fail to reject the null that the two estimates are the same in 75% of cases at the 5% level 
and in 81% cases at the 10% level, far exceeding the expected failure rate under random 
chance and again providing strong support for the monotonicity model of peer effects. 
  27Next, we provide a formal test of the boutique model by testing whether the 
impact of peers in the same quartile as the native student is greater than the effect when 
peers are in other quartiles. Figure 6 shows the histogram of the counts of t-statistics of 
from pair wise tests of equality between exposure to evacuees from natives’ own and 
other quartiles. T-statistics larger than 1.645 provide support for the boutique model at 
the 10% significance level. While the evidence here is less conclusive than the evidence 
of monotonicity, 27% of all cases have a t-stat greater than 1.64, although most of these 
are for natives in the 3
rd and 4
th quartile where the boutique and monotonicity models 
overlap.  
Finally, we do a test of the linear-in-means model. An implication of linear-in-
means is that the impact of evacuee share from a given quartile on a native student in the 
1
st quartile should be exactly opposite to the impact on a native student in the 4
th quartile. 
Thus, using a seemingly unrelated regression combining the regressions in each panel of 
Table 4, we test the null that βi1 = -βi4 where i is the evacuee quartile and “1” and “4” are 
the lowest and highest native quartiles, respectively. For this test, accepting the null for 
90% of all cases would be consistent with a linear in means model at the 10% level of 
statistical significance, but we can only accept the null in 44% of the cases. Thus, we 
interpret this to be a clear rejection of the linear-in-means model. 
Table 5 shows results for Houston.
18 These are also consistent with a 
monotonicity story, but less so with a boutique model and clearly reject the invidious 
                                                 
18 We must make a note of caution with regards to the Houston results, however, as we do not have pre-
Katrina test scores on the evacuees. This forces us to use the concurrent scores for evacuees to determine 
whether they are above or below median, which may introduce bias. Nonetheless, the fact that the Houston 
results are consistent with the LA results makes us confident that we are indeed identifying true models of 
peer effects. 
  28comparison model.
19 In Houston, the arrival of low achieving peers hurts all native 
students, but this effect is more negative for low achieving natives in elementary and high 
achieving natives in secondary schools. By contrast, the arrival of high achieving 
evacuees benefits everyone, though the biggest benefit is for the low achieving natives. In 
this case, we test monotonicity by checking whether exposure to above median evacuees 
has a larger impact than being exposed to below median evacuees. The null for this test 
can be rejected at the 5% level in 50% of the cases providing clear support for the 
monotonicity model. On the other hand, none of the point estimates are negative, hence 
we can clearly reject the invidious comparison model. These tests also provide us with a 
boutique story similar to that in LA. We only find evidence of boutiqueing in higher 
native quartiles, a result that overlaps with monotonicity. Finally, we also conducted the 
Houston equivalent of the linear-in-means test described above. We are able to reject 
linear-in-means at the 10% level in 3 out of 8 cases. While this is not as strong as the 
results for LA, they nonetheless exceed random chance. 
The results from non-linear models also show patterns which are more consistent 
with peer effects than with alternative stories of the impact of Katrina evacuees on 
schools. For example, if the influx of Katrina evacuees reduced school resources (either 
by increasing class size, by reducing expenditures per student, or by reducing the quality 
of teachers), both high achieving and low achieving evacuees should reduce native 
performance. Instead, we find that high achieving evacuees increase native performance 
and low achieving evacuees reduce native performance. 
 
                                                 
19 We also conducted a classroom level analysis with student fixed-effects which had qualitatively similar 
results and is available upon request. 
  296.  Effects of Evacuees on Native Students’ Behavior 
Our detailed administrative data also allows an examination of the effects of peers 
on attendance and discipline. Moreover, the data on behavioral outcomes allows us to 
examine whether the impact we observe on academic performance is working through 
peer achievement or through disciplinary disruptions. 
6.1.  Peer Effects on Attendance 
Aside from the impact that students may have on others’ academic performance, 
they may also affect behavior and willingness to accept and follow rules. Our interviews 
with principals and teachers in Houston, indicated that even basic rules such as showing 
up to school on time or at all were problematic with some of the evacuees. News reports 
at the time indicated that while many evacuee students may have been enrolled in 
schools, they may not have been attending regularly (Garza, 2006) and, indeed, our 
results in Table 2 for Houston suggest this. Moreover, news reports as well as our own 
interviews pointed to bigger behavioral problems related to the evacuees. For example, in 
our interviews with elementary school teachers, some indicated that the evacuees were 
more likely to “talk back to the teachers” and that some of the non-evacuee children 
imitated this behavior. At the secondary school level, the differences in behavior between 
evacuee and non-evacuee students, according to the teachers, manifested more in terms of 
truancy, fighting and engaging in risky behaviors. 
The HISD data allows us to measure the impact of the influx of hurricane 
evacuees on attendance. Table 6 presents difference-in-differences results of the effects 
of the influx of Katrina students on the attendance rate. Panel A presents results for 
elementary students and Panel B presents results for middle and high school students. 
  30The results in Table 6 show a clear increase in absenteeism in middle and high-school. 
An increase in the influx of Katrina students of 10 percentage points reduces attendance 
in secondary schools by 0.7 percentage points.
20 Attendance is a particularly substantial 
problem for African-American native students after the influx of Katrina students, with a 
10 percentage point influx of Katrina students generating a reduction in the attendance 
rate of 1.3 percentage points in middle and high-schools.
21 
6.2.  Effects of Misbehaving Peers 
  Aside from asking if the arrival of hurricane evacuees affected adversely the 
behavior of native kids, we also ask whether the presence of “problematic” kids and, in 
particular, kids with disciplinary problems generates the adverse effects on academic 
performance and behavior of native kids. That is, low native academic achievement may 
be due to the presence of low-performing evacuees who lower the level of the class or 
require more attention from the teacher or due to the presence of disruptive kids who 
simply do not allow for the regular class functioning to continue. To explore this latter 
channel through which peer effects may be working, we estimate regressions like 
equation (4) for test scores, attendance and counts of disciplinary infractions. 
  Table 7 presents the results of these regressions. Surprisingly, the presence of 
undisciplined kids does not seem to make a difference in terms of academic achievement 
and disciplinary infractions in Louisiana.
22 Similarly, for Houston, we do not find any 
effect of having poorly behaving kids on math and ELA test scores. This suggests that 
                                                 
20 While the IV coefficient in Column (7) is positive it is also very imprecise. Results from the placebo 
experiment are also insignificant. 
21 Similar regressions of disciplinary infractions for Houston and Louisiana (not shown here but available 
upon request) show no statistically significant average effect of the influx of hurricane evacuees on the 
discipline of their peers except for Hispanics and boys in Houston middle and high-school, though this is 
only significant at the 10% level. However, below we show that having a larger share of disciplined 
evacuees does affect native discipline. 
22 We find similar results (available upon request) in non-linear specifications. 
  31peer effects in our context are working through academic achievement rather than 
through disciplinary disruptions. On the other hand, we do find that having more 
misbehaved children increases disciplinary problems in both elementary schools and in 
middle and high schools.
23 This suggests that peer effects in terms of discipline are only 
relevant when the peers are misbehaved and the natives can learn these behaviors. 
  In Table 8 we further explore the impact of having undisciplined children in a 
classroom by using the Houston data, in which we can identify the students in each 
classroom.
24 In particular, we try to get at the “bad apple” model by testing whether the 
presence of even 1 or 2 disruptive evacuee children affect the academic achievement and 
behavior of natives. Since this analysis is done at the classroom level, we may be 
concerned about endogenous sorting across classrooms. Thus, to address this issue we 
have added student fixed-effects to the regressions. The results for academic achievement 
only show that having many undisciplined children in a classroom lowers math test 
scores. By contrast, the results for discipline and attendance do show that it is enough to 
have 1 or 2 misbehaving evacuee children to worsen the attendance and behavior of 
native kids in elementary schools. In middle- and high-schools, only having many 
undisciplined kids in a classroom worsens native behavior. Thus, we take this as 
supportive evidence of the “bad apple” model for elementary school kids but only in 
terms of behavior and not in terms of achievement. 
 
                                                 
23 One caveat to this analysis is that we are limited to using concurrent infractions as our behavior measure 
in Houston. Thus it is, admittedly, possible that these results reflect school specific policies on how they 
disciplined evacuees and natives after the storms. 
24 HISD high schools operate on a semester schedule. Thus, for middle- and high-schools, we average 
evacuee shares across students’ classes in both semesters. In addition, the estimates for math and reading in 
middle- and high-school are identified using only exposure in math and reading/English classes, 
respectively. Attendance and discipline use exposure in all classes. Further, the middle- and high-school 
regressions are limited to 2004-05 and 2005-06 due to data limitations. 
  327.  Effects of Katrina Evacuees on Resources and Student Attrition 
  The reduced-form effects of the influx of Katrina evacuees on test-scores, 
attendance and discipline could be due to the externalities of evacuees on natives. 
However, another possibility is that the influx of evacuees reduced the resources 
available for natives or that the best native students were leaving the schools and districts 
with evacuees. 
7.1. Effects on Resources 
  The influx of evacuees could have affected the resources available to evacuees by 
increasing class-size, reducing operating and instructional expenditures per employee and 
reducing teacher quality if the composition of teachers changed. 
  Table 9 reports results of regressions like equation (1), but where the dependent 
variable is class size at the school level.
25 Panel A reports results for Louisiana while 
Panel B reports results for Houston. For Louisiana we do not have the exact average 
class-size in each school but rather the percent of classes with sizes between 1 and 20, 
between 21 and 26, or higher than 26. These results for Louisiana show little change in 
class sizes for elementary students. For middle-school and high-school there is a shift 
from classes of 20 or fewer students to classes of 21 - 26 students. However, this shift is 
relatively small. A 10 percentage point increase in evacuee share only shifts between 2 
and 3 percent of classrooms to the higher category. In addition, there is no evidence of an 
increase in the share of classes that are over 26 students. By contrast, for Houston we 
have the exact average class size per grade in elementary school and by subject for 
                                                 
25 Since we cannot include grade fixed effects in these regressions, as schools span multiple grades, in 
Houston we include the percent of students in the school in each grade as covariates and interact with year 
dummies. We also include the percent black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and economically 
disadvantaged as covariates. These variables are not available for Louisiana. 
  33middle-school and high-school. These results show no statistically significant effect of 
the fraction of evacuees on class-size in elementary schools. In middle and high-schools 
there is little evidence that the influx of evacuees significantly increased class-size, 
except for class-sizes in social studies which shows a marginally significant effect. 
  Table 10 shows results of regressions of operating and instructional expenditures 
per student and average teacher experience on the evacuee share in Houston.
26 The 
results once again show no statistically significant effect of the influx of evacuees on 
either operating or instructional expenditures per student. This is likely because the 
Federal and State Governments seemed to have reimbursed schools and districts almost 
fully. Also, interviews with principals in Houston, suggested that schools received 
substantial aid from a number of foundations around the country. 
                                                
  Since class-size increases in response to the evacuees were, at worst, minor, it is 
likely that new classes were being created as students came in. This means that the 
quality of teachers could have changed as a result. Thus, we look at how evacuees 
affected average teacher experience, education, and certification. While there is no 
significant effect on these teacher quality measures in middle/high schools or on teacher 
experience in elementary schools, the graduate education and certification rates of 
teachers actually improve in elementary schools. A 10 percentage point increase in 
evacuee share increases the share of teachers with a graduate degree and the share 
certified by 3 percentage points each. This could be explained by HISD likely having 
more applicants for jobs from amongst the evacuees than spaces available, and thus the 
district chose more experienced and certified teachers.  Nonetheless, if anything this 
result would bias us against finding peer effects which we find in both linear and non-
 
26 This data is not available for Louisiana.   
  34linear models in Houston elementary schools, thus it is unlikely that these changes in 
teacher characteristics would have a meaningful impact on our estimates. 
Another concern is that one may worry that evacuees were all assigned to the 
same classes together so that there may had been little room for spillovers. However, 
when we looked at the distribution of the number of evacuees by class in Houston, where 
we have classroom level data, virtually all classrooms with evacuees also had native 
students and the vast majority of classrooms with evacuees had between one and four 
evacuees. 
7.2. Effects on Native Student Mobility 
  Another reason why test scores and behavior could have changed in response to 
the influx of Katrina evacuees is if the best students moved in response to the arrival of 
evacuees. To test this we run a regression like equation (1) but in which the dependent 
variable is the probability of switching school the following year as well as the 
probability of leaving the district in the case of Houston.
27 
  Panel A of Table 11 shows results for mobility in Louisiana, while Panel B shows 
results of mobility for Houston. The results show no statistically significant change in the 
mobility of students from schools with a high share of evacuees to schools with a low 
share of evacuees in either Louisiana or Houston.
28 Similarly, we find no effect on 
mobility out of the district for middle-school and high-school students in Houston. We do 
find a reduction in HISD district leavers at the elementary level, but it is only marginally 
significant. 
                                                 
27 To avoid switching and leaving due to normal progression to middle and high-school and due to 
graduation, we limit the school switching estimates to students who are not in the maximum grade for their 
school. We also limit the district leaver regressions to students in grades 1 - 11. 
28 Due to only grades 4, 8, and 10 being available prior to Katrina in LA, and to grade 8 being a transition 
year from middle to high school, we are limited to grades 4 and 10 in this analysis for LA.  
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evacuees is likely to have worked either through reduced resources or through changes in 
the composition of native students. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the impact of an exogenous influx of low-socio-
economic background students on the academic performance and behaviors of their 
peers. We exploit the influx of evacuees from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita into school 
districts in Louisiana that were unaffected by the storms and into the Houston 
Independent School District to estimate their impact on non-evacuee (native) peers. 
We use student-level data from Louisiana’s Department of Education and from 
the Houston Independent School District to estimate the impact on math and language 
test scores as well as on disciplinary infractions and absenteeism in the case of Houston. 
We find that, on average, evacuees had little impact on native outcomes with the 
exception of a negative impact on math scores in elementary schools and attendance in 
middle/high schools in Houston. However, linear models hide a substantial amount of 
variation across achievement levels of natives and evacuees. Non-linear models show that 
high achieving natives are significantly positively affected by high achieving evacuees 
and significantly negatively impacted by low achieving evacuees. Low achieving natives 
also generally benefit from high achieving evacuees and are hurt by low achieving 
evacuees in terms of their own test scores, though this effect is muted in Louisiana. 
Using these non-linear models we are able to explicitly test a variety of peer 
effects models identified in Hoxby and Weingarth (2006). We find strong evidence in 
support of monotonic peer effects where students benefit more from having higher 
  36achieving peers. We also see some, albeit weaker, evidence that students benefit from 
being around peers of the same achievement level - a boutique model. Nevertheless, we 
clearly reject the linear-in-means model and the invidious comparison model where 
students benefit from being amongst lower performing peers. Moreover, we test the “bad 
apple” theory where having a only a handful of disruptive peers in a classroom is 
detrimental to other students. While we see no evidence of this in terms of test scores, we 
do find that having a few misbehaving evacuees in an elementary classroom appears to 
worsen behavior of native students both in terms of attendance and disciplinary 
infractions. 
We interpret these results as being largely due to peer effects, since we find no 
statistically significant effects of the influx of Katrina/Rita evacuees on class size except 
for a small increase in middle/high schools in Louisiana, on expenditures per student, on 
average teacher quality or on mobility of students, which would be the other potential 
explanations. In addition, the fact that evacuees of various achievement and behavior 
levels affect natives differently is consistent with peer effects driving our results and 
inconsistent with the alternative explanations described above. 
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Female 0.489 0.483 0.490 0.492
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
White 0.537 0.379 0.093 0.039
(0.499) (0.485) (0.290) (0.192)
Hispanic 0.015 0.018 0.585 0.039
(0.121) (0.133) (0.493) (0.193)
Black 0.439 0.588 0.290 0.903
(0.496) (0.492) (0.454) (0.296)
Asian 0.010 0.015 0.032 0.019
(0.097) (0.122) (0.177) (0.137)
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 0.567 0.807 0.787 0.968
(0.495) (0.394) (0.409) (0.175)
At-Risk - - 0.691 0.941
- - (0.462) (0.235)
Fraction Katrina/Rita Evacuee in School 0.041 0.089 0.027 0.066
(0.042) (0.072) (0.031) (0.051)
Observations 326,551 14,628 171,659 4,986
Math (Standard Deviations) 0.026 -0.240 0.000 -0.742
(0.996) (1.040) (1.000) (1.026)
Observations 300,216 10,708 112,241 2,151
English & Language Arts (Standard Deviations) 0.018 -0.205 0.000 -0.582
(0.994) (1.049) (1.000) (1.063)
Observations 301,797 10,760 113,977 2,307
Disciplinary Infractions 0.295 0.335 0.629 0.893
(0.585) (0.624) (1.698) (1.987)
Observations 302,640 10,776 171,659 4,986
Attendance - - 94.55 83.30
-- (8.97) (18.00)
Observations - - 171,659 4,986
Standard deviations in parentheses. Includes students in grades 3 - 10 for LA and 1 - 12 for Houston. Houston testing only
covers grades 3 - 11. The sample in LA is limited to schools where there are < 70% evacuees and excludes schools in Orleans,
Jefferson, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Cameron, and Calcasieu parishes. Disciplinary infractions total number of suspensions and
expulsions in a year in LA and the total number of infractions resulting in an in-school suspensions or more severe punishment
in Houston.
Test Scores, Discipline, and Attendance
Table 1: Characteristics of Evacuees and Native Louisiana & Houston Students - 2005-06
Demographics
A. Louisiana B. Houston-0.12*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.41*** -0.15***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 40,601 120,901 118,377 43,886 38,345
-0.14*** -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.22*** -0.19***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 40,611 120,903 118,351 45,073 39,149
0.043 -0.023*** 0.038*** -0.03 0.02
(0.028) (0.007) (0.014) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 37,614 120,934 118,416 83,455 71,058
- - - -6.00*** -2.19***
- - - (0.33) (0.29)
Observations - - - 83,455 71,058
-0.07** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.49*** -0.26***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 40,674 190,020 186,622 70,506 61,404
-0.11*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.53*** -0.41***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.06)
Observations 39,621 191,651 186,892 71,211 61,954
0.14*** -0.005 0.040*** -0.12* 0.41***
(0.05) (0.010) (0.009) (0.07) (0.13)




Table 2: Regressions of Katrina/Rita Evacuee Status on Test Scores
A. Louisiana






Math (LEAP & TAKS)
English Language Arts/ 
Reading (LEAP & TAKS)
2005-06 2006-07
2005-06 2006-07
Standard errors are provided in parentheses and clustered by school. Regressions include student's race, gender,
free/reduced price lunch status, and school fixed-effects. LEAP scores are standard deviations of scale scores
within grade and year for all students. TAKS scores standard deviations of scale scores within grade and year





English Language Arts/ 





AttendanceAll Black Hispanic Boys Girls Placebo 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Math 0.16 -0.20 - 0.18 0.14 -0.10 -
(0.12) (0.17) - (0.14) (0.14) (0.34) -
Observations 315,719 141,232 - 162,266 153,453 83,287 -
English & Language Arts -0.03 0.22 - 0.02 -0.08 -0.00 -
(0.10) (0.17) - (0.12) (0.12) (0.23) -
Observations 315,710 141,242 - 162,253 153,457 140,866 -
Math -0.13 0.07 - -0.19 -0.08 0.11 -
(0.14) (0.17) - (0.15) (0.14) (0.40) -
Observations 505,543 209,474 - 251,013 254,530 83,302 -
English & Language Arts -0.09 -0.18 - -0.22 0.03 -0.09 -
(0.12) (0.17) - (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) -
Observations 504,131 208,164 - 250,762 253,369 137,620 -
Math -0.91** -1.22 -0.17 -0.71 -1.07** -0.21 -1.02*
(0.45) (0.75) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.56) (0.60)
Observations 170,727 45,921 104,831 85,611 85,116 89,207 170,727
Reading -0.37 -0.70 -0.03 -0.40 -0.36 0.00 -0.00
(0.28) (0.51) (0.38) (0.35) (0.28) (0.38) (0.45)
Observations 171,520 47,903 103,261 86,712 84,808 146,062 171,520
Math 0.40 0.22 0.52 0.55 0.23 0.03 0.79
(0.37) (0.61) (0.38) (0.46) (0.32) (0.47) (0.65)
Observations 276,378 81,790 155,919 137,064 139,314 88,084 267,378
Reading 0.06 -0.14 -0.16 0.10 -0.02 -0.30 0.72
(0.40) (0.53) (0.48) (0.48) (0.34) (0.34) (0.56)
Observations 278,606 82,217 157,461 138,159 140,447 147,140 278,606
Standard errors are provided in parentheses and clustered by school. Regressions cover 2003-04 - 2006-07 and include student's race,
gender, free/reduced price lunch status, and school fixed-effects. TAKS scores are standard deviations of scale scores within grade and year
excluding evacuees. When students have multiple scores for a single subject in a given year we use the lowest score. LEAP scores are
standard deviations of scale scores within grade and year for all students. Placebo regresions are limited to pre-Katrina years and apply the
2005-06 evacuee shares to 2004-05 observations. 2SLS regressions use Katrina/Rita share on 9/13/05 as an instrument for evacuee share.
Elementary is defined as any student in grades 3 - 5. Middle/High is any student in grade 6 - 11 for Houston or 6 - 10 for Louisiana. Prior
to 2005 only grades 4, 8, and 10 were tested in Louisiana.  *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Table 3: Difference in Differences Estimates of  Evacuee Share of Enrollment in School on Native Test Scores
A. Louisiana - LEAP Exams, Elementary
B. Louisiana - LEAP Exams, Middle/High
C. Houston - TAKS Exams, Elementary
D. Houston - TAKS Exams, Middle/High2003 or 2004 LEAP Quartile 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Katrina/Rita Share in Quartile 1 -0.36 -0.16 -2.03** -0.82 -0.78* -1.44*** -1.20 -2.00**
(0.32) (0.43) (0.87) (1.07) (0.41) (0.53) (0.76) (0.83)
Katrina/Rita Share in Quartile 2 -0.31 -1.86** -2.03 -4.04** -0.18 -1.93*** -1.84** -0.46
(0.61) (0.91) (1.25) (1.63) (0.69) (0.73) (0.87) (1.01)
Katrina/Rita Share in Quartile 3 -0.66 0.25 0.53 1.45 -0.44 0.87 1.10 0.37
(0.89) (1.07) (1.36) (1.59) (0.81) (0.61) (0.77) (0.84)
Katrina/Rita Share in Quartile 4 0.94 2.18** 4.95*** 4.54*** 1.80** 2.36*** 1.52 2.29***
(0.99) (1.07) (1.28) (1.16) (0.89) (0.77) (0.94) (0.85)
Observations 30,674 30,970 31,647 32,483 58,534 79,443 89,686 95,586
Katrina/Rita Share in Quartile 1 0.09 -0.55 -2.57*** -2.83*** -0.28 -1.72*** -2.42*** -3.99***
(0.36) (0.42) (0.88) (0.94) (0.62) (0.46) (0.71) (0.80)
Katrina/Rita Share in Quartile 2 -1.09** -1.13 -1.76* -0.15 0.96 -0.80 -1.31 -0.59
(0.55) (0.82) (1.00) (1.16) (0.99) (0.61) (0.86) (0.84)
Katrina/Rita Share in Quartile 3 -1.98*** -0.62 -1.04 -0.67 -0.41 0.03 0.23 0.84
(0.72) (0.88) (1.12) (1.28) (1.02) (0.67) (0.81) (0.96)
Katrina/Rita Share in Quartile 4 0.95 1.09 1.96** 2.35*** 0.48 1.77*** 2.19*** 2.26***
(0.76) (0.82) (0.85) (0.73) (1.04) (0.67) (0.73) (0.70)
Observations 30,853 30,774 31,629 32,543 59,085 79,340 88,123 94,606
Table 4 - Nonlinear Models of Evacuee Share in School and Evacuee Achievement on Native Achievement - Louisiana
Standard errors are provided in parentheses and clustered by school. Regressions cover 2003-04 - 2006-07 and include student's race, gender, free lunch status, and school
fixed-effects. LEAP scores are standard deviations of scale scores within grade and year for all students. Elementary is defined as any student in grades 3 - 5.
Middle/High is any student in grade 6 - 11 for Houston or 6 - 10 for Louisiana. Quartiles for both evacuees and natives are within grade across the state data and
determined from their 2003-04 or 2004-05 score depending on which is available since prior to 2005-06 only grades 4, 8, and 10 were tested. *, **, and *** reflect





Katrina/Rita Share Below Median Score in Grade -0.77 -1.07** -1.08* -0.11 -0.89 -0.66 -0.75 -1.28
(0.77) (0.45) (0.59) (0.31) (1.31) (0.75) (0.50) (0.80)
Katrina/Rita Share Above Median Score in Grade 3.17 2.25 -0.83 0.02 22.20*** 8.20** 8.03*** 8.88**
(6.32) (3.78) (4.75) (4.43) (8.03) (3.95) (2.89) (3.42)
Observations 29,837 30,554 30,688 27,858 54,980 61,872 61,196 62,431
Share Above Median - Share Below Median 3.94 3.31 0.24 0.13 23.09** 8.86** 8.77*** 10.15**
(6.53) (3.84) (4.78) (4.39) (8.87) (4.49) (3.23) (4.01)
Katrina/Rita Share Below Median Score in Grade -0.85 -0.79* -0.09 0.31 -1.13 -0.75 -2.03*** -2.26***
(1.30) (0.40) (0.44) (0.72) (1.63) (0.61) (0.48) (0.59)
Katrina/Rita Share Above Median Score in Grade 3.38 5.48*** 3.86 0.24 15.96* 6.84*** 9.12*** 8.05***
(4.93) (1.97) (2.57) (5.38) (9.42) (2.49) (1.69) (2.29)
Observations 27,975 31,081 28,034 24,675 55,266 64,024 61,849 61,050
Share Above Median - Share Below Median 4.23 6.27*** 3.95 -0.07 17.08 7.59** 11.15*** 10.32***
(5.81) (2.21) (2.89) (6.00) (10.48) (2.97) (2.06) (2.78)
Standard errors are provided in parentheses and clustered by school. Regressions cover 2003-04 - 2006-07 and include student's race, gender, free/reduced price lunch status, and school fixed-
effects. TAKS scores are standard deviations of scale scores within grade and year excluding evacuees. When students have multiple scores for a single subject in a given year we use the lowest
score. Quartiles for natives are from 2004-05. Above and below medians for evacuees are calculated from 2005-06 data based on the district-wide distribution within each grade. Elementary is
defined as any student in grades 1 - 5.  Middle/High is any student in grade 6 - 12.  *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Table 5 - Nonlinear Models of Evacuee Share in School and Evacuee Achievement on Native Achievement in Houston
Math
A. Elementary B. Middle/High
ReadingAll Black Hispanic Boys Girls Placebo 2SLS
 Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Attendance Rate -0.82 -1.16 -0.42 -1.44 -0.14 -0.39 0.84
(0.83) (1.89) (0.86) (1.10) (0.79) (0.78) (1.28)
Observations 322,524 88,005 197,948 165,651 156,873 170,092 322,524
Attendance Rate -6.95* -13.05*** -3.82 -6.67 -7.06** -4.84 -3.38
(3.90) (3.75) (6.48) (4.83) (3.33) (2.92) (6.25)
Observations 353,484 108,778 196,031 178,644 174,840 184,408 353,484
Table 6 - Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Evacuee Share of Enrollment on Native Attendance Rates in Houston
A. Elementary
B. Middle/High
Standard errors are provided in parentheses and clustered by school. Regressions cover 2003-04 - 2006-07 and include student's race, gender,
free/reduced price lunch status, and school fixed-effects. 2SLS estimates use Katrina/Rita share on 9/13/05 excluding students living at the stadium
complex or covention center as the excluded instrument. The placebo test in column (7) include 2003-04 and 2004-05 only and apply 2005-06
Katrina/Rita share to 2004-05 observations. Elementary is defined as any student in grades 1 - 5. Middle/High is any student in grade 6 - 12. *, **,
and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. LEAP Math LEAP ELA Disciplinary 
Infractions
LEAP Math LEAP ELA Disciplinary 
Infractions
Katrina/Rita Share 0.190 -0.054 0.005 -0.106 -0.067 -0.032
(0.135) (0.113) (0.103) (0.141) (0.121) (0.115)
Katrina/Rita Share *  -0.013 0.213 0.145 -0.001 -0.006 -0.120
   Avg Evac Infracs in 2004-05 (0.074) (0.179) (0.098) (0.105) (0.083) (0.085)














Katrina/Rita Share -0.590 -0.372 -0.623* -0.843 1.526 0.304 -3.57* -10.383**
(0.765) (0.451) (0.364) (1.419) (1.015) (0.917) (2.004) (4.935)
Katrina/Rita Share * -0.598 0.008 1.005** 0.048 -0.557 -0.122 2.55*** 1.727
   Avg Evac Infracs (0.883) (0.586) (0.471) (1.593) (0.396) (0.917) (0.646) (2.529)
Observations 170,727 171,520 322,524 322,524 276,378 278,606 353,484 353,484
Disciplinary infractions in LA is the number of suspensions or expulsions a student incurs in a year. Disciplinary infractions in Houston is the number of times in a year
the student was given an in-school suspension or more severe punishment. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and clustered by school. Regressions cover 2003-04
- 2006-07 and include student's race, gender, free/reduced price lunch status, and school fixed-effects. LEAP scores are standard deviations of scale scores within grade
and year for all students. TAKS are standard deviations within grade excluding evacuees. Elementary is defined as any student in grades 1 - 5. Middle/High is any student
in grade 6 - 12.  *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Table 7 - Impact of Evacuee Behavior on Native Outcome
A. Louisiana
B. Houuston
I. Elementary II  Middle/High








> 1 and < 3 Evacuees with Any Infraction -0.016 -0.015 -0.162** 0.068*** 0.001 0.008 -0.33 0.03
(0.025) (0.021) (0.065) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.21) (0.08)
>= 3 Evacuees with Any Infraction -0.100* 0.020 0.002 0.103 0.053 0.026 -1.27 0.93**
(0.057) (0.060) (0.495) (0.085) (0.037) (0.048) (1.02) (0.45)
> 1 and < 3 Evacuees 0.006 0.012 0.031 0.002 0.005 -0.031*** -0.48** -0.06
(0.016) (0.012) (0.033) (0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.20) (0.07)
>= 3 Evacuees -0.024 0.025 0.198** -0.013 -0.034 -0.026 -1.51*** -0.09
(0.033) (0.021) (0.083) (0.022) (0.036) (0.023) (0.43) (0.14)
Class Size -0.004** -0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.00 -0.00
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 160,687 160,547 296,899 296,899 128,420 129,989 167,379 167,379
-0.083* 0.035 0.164 0.035 0.052 0.017 -0.93 0.91**
(0.050) (0.052) (0.496) (0.086) (0.036) (0.043) (1.00) (0.42)
Evacuee counts and shares in middle and high school are averages over all math classes a student takes for math regressions, all reading and english classes for
reading regressions, and all reading, math, science, social studies, and english classes for attendance and discipline. Standard errors are provided in parentheses
and clustered by school. Elementary regressions cover 2003-04 - 2006-07 and middle/high regressions cover 2004-05 and 2005-06. Regressions include student's
race, gender, free/reduced price lunch status, and school fixed-effects. Student fixed effects are added to address potential sorting across classrooms. TAKS
scores are standard deviations of scale scores within grade and year excluding evacuees. When students have multiple scores for a single subject in a given year
we use the lowest score. Disciplinary infractions are the number of times in a year the student was given an in-school suspension or more severe punishment.
Elementary is defined as any student in grades 1 - 5. Middle/High is any student in grade 6 - 12. *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.  
Table 8 - Tests of "Bad Apple" Models Using Houston Classroom Level Data
A. Elementary B.  Middle/High
Test of  >= 3 Evacuees with Any Infraction 
vs. > 1 and < 3 Evacuees with Any Elementary 1 to 20 Elementary 21 - 26 Elementary 27+
Katrina/Rita Fraction 0.18 -0.17 -0.01
(0.11) (0.13) (0.08)
Observations 2191 2191 2191
Mid/High 1 to 20 Mid/High 21 - 26 Mid/High 27+
Katrina/Rita Fraction -0.27* 0.22** -0.01
(0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 1571 1571 1571
Kindergarten Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Katrina/Rita Fraction 0.30 -12.77 -0.39 -13.61
(9.11) (7.78) (8.17) (10.33)
Observations 695 706 713 713
Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 (Elem) Mid/High English
Katrina/Rita Fraction 0.94 -14.69 1.08 48.83
(8.84) (14.20) (33.04) (33.23)
Observations 713 701 273 327
Mid/High Math Mid/High Science Mid/High Social Studies Mid/High Foreign Lang
Katrina/Rita Fraction 19.40 23.17 34.99* -34.71
(18.29) (20.62) (19.72) (36.15)
Observations 328 326 318 265
Unit of observation is the school-year. Regressions cover 2003-04 - 2005-06 and include school fixed-effects and year dummies. Houston regressions also
include % of school at each grade level as well as % black, Hispanic, asian, Native American, and economically disadvantaged. Elementary is defined as any
school covering at least one of grades KG - 5. Middle/High is any covering at least one of grades 6 - 12. *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.  
B. Houston - Average Class Size By Grade or Subject
Table 9: Effect of Evacuee Share on Class Sizes
A. Louisiana - % of Classes in Given Size RangeOperating Instructional Avg Teacher
Expenditures Expenditures Experience
-1,787 342 -3.02 0.337** 0.313*
(5,087) (3,856) (5.86) (0.169) (0.168)
Observations 791 791 763 763 763
Operating Instructional Avg Teacher
Expenditures Expenditures Experience
12,748 8,411 -1.66 -0.567 0.602
(13,717) (9,764) (13.00) (0.345) (0.561)
Observations 492 492 464 464 464
A. Louisiana
Grade 4 Elementary Middle/High
0.204 0.293 0.064
(0.414) (0.234) (0.073)
Observations 51,047 209,302 206,205
Grade 10 Elementary Middle/High
Leaves HISD in
year t + 1
‡
Leaves HISD in




Observations 38,282 252,239 248,456
† Limited to students not in the maximum grade for a school in year t.
‡ Excludes grade 12.






Table 11: School Switching in Response to Evacuee Shares
% of Teachers w/ 
Grad Degree
% of Teachers w/ 
Certification
% of Teachers w/ 
Grad Degree
% of Teachers w/ 
Certification
Middle/High
Unit of observation is the school-year. All expenditures are per-student. Regressions cover 2003-04 - 2005-06 and include school fixed-
effects and year dummies, % of school at each grade level as well as % black, Hispanic, asian, Native American, and economically
disadvantaged. Elementary is defined as any school covering at least one of grades KG - 5. Middle/High is any covering at least one of
grades 6 - 12.  *, **, and *** reflect significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Switches in
year t + 1
Standard errors are provided in parentheses and clustered by school. Regressions cover 2003-
04 - 2006-07 and include student's race, gender, free/reduced price lunch status, and school
fixed-effects. Elementary is defined as any student in grades 1 - 5. Middle/High is any








year t + 1
Switches in
year t + 1
† 
Switches in
year t + 1
† Figure 2: Hurricane Katrina and Rita Evacuees in HISD 


































LEAP Math LEAP ELA
Each bar shows the percent of evacuee students in 2005 who's 2004-05 test scores are in the listed decile of the native
distribution of 2004-05 test scores in the 2005-06 school.


































TAKS - Math TAKS - Reading Attendance Rate
Each bar shows the percent of native or evacuee students in 2005-06 who are in the listed decile of the within-school native
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Figure 5 - T-Statistics for Pairwise Tests
of Monotonicity & Invidious Comparison
 
Strongly Monotonic 












-5 -3 -1.645 0 1.645 3 5
T-statistic
Figure 6 - T-Statistics for Pairwise Tests
of Boutiqueing
  
Boutiqueing 